This paper analyses income smoothing through loan loss provisions and cyclicality of reserves in a [2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010] sample of 198 Central European banks. We find empirical evidence for income smoothing in Central European banks, which displays a discretionary character and may relate to a non-prudential motivation. This is exacerbated by the fact that strong procyclicality of bank loan loss provisions emerges in relation to economic growth. Thus, banks in Central Europe do not take advantage of macroeconomic upheavals to build sufficient reserve cushions and may have to use capital to cover credit losses during economic downturns. This exacerbates the existing procyclicality of capital regulations and may increase the probability of a credit crunch.
Introduction
The phenomenon of income smoothing in financial institutions has been widely analysed in existing literature, both from a theoretical perspective and through empirical models (see e.g. Lambert 1984 , Healy and Wahlen 1999 , Bikker and Metzemakers 2005 .
However, the bulk of research relates to developed countries, comprising Western European and US banks, or international samples with some share of developing countries. In addition, empirical results base on bank data from the pre-2008 period, when macroeconomic environments were relatively stable and banking sectors more predictable. The aim of this paper is to analyse income smoothing in a developing country sample only, with a relatively high level of homogeneity of banking sectors, all based in Central European countries. The study uses recent bank data from the period between 2005 and 2010, encompassing financial crisis years and possible changes in bank policies. The relatively short time span allows to avoid the effects of accounting regulation changes, with IFRS standards valid for the whole period.
The importance of analysing income smoothing in banks has been repetitively mentioned Majnoni 2003, Perez et al. 2008 ) and re-emerges in the post-crisis environment. The crucial aspects of income smoothing stem from its strong role in reducing or increasing procyclical policies of banks, both towards internal bank profitability and credit cycles as well as versus macroeconomic cycles. In addition, income smoothing performed through loan loss provisions has direct links with the level of capital in banks and the procyclicality of capital requirements. As the debate on optimal capital requirements continues, potential input from income smoothing has to be accounted for. This paper analyses income smoothing in Central European banks and the procyclicality of loan loss provisions between [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review and existing empirical results, Section 3 describes the methodology and desrciptive statistics of bank data used in the paper, in Section 4 we demonstrate the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical background of income smoothing
Income smoothing, as a part of a wider earnings management field, is studied both within financial and non-financial institutions. In non-financial companies, the process carries strong negative implications, as earnings are manipulated so that "they do not accurately represent economic earnings at every point in time" (Goel and Thakor 2003, p.151) . As a result, earnings management masks the true economic performance of companies (Leuz et al. 2003) . Activities of financial institutions differ and many authors claim that some degree of earnings management in the form of income smoothing is in fact recommendable (see e.g. Laeven et al. 2003 , Perez et al. 2008 , Fonseca and Gonzalez 2008 .
Income smoothing in banks is a process that entails taking advantage of high earnings to create a buffer of reserves, which are consumed during cyclical downturns. In such a way profitability is restricted in the boost periods, while losses are softened when times are rough.
In consequence, bank income streams are made less volatile over time. Due to banks' specific activities, created reserves are however not random and frequently are related to banks' credit risk management policies. All financial institutions maintain credit portfolios, with a certain share of currently healthy loans that is bound to default. This share may be estimated, basing on historical defaults and market analyses, so that the underlying expected value of the loan book is its nominal value reduced by the assessed bad credit load. Taking this into account, income smoothing may be regarded as a process of forward-looking reserve creation, where banks make reserves not only for the existing, but also for the expected defaults in their portfolios (Laeven and Majnoni 2003) . This frequently overlaps with the credit and economic cycle, as most bad loans are granted during economic expansion times, while pressing needs for reserves emerge during downturns. Income smoothing through loan loss provisions made in the boost times is thus frequently referred to as "saving for a rainy day" (Greenawalt and Sinkey 1988) .
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In that respect, it's treated positively and recommended both in the literature and in some supervisory regimes (e.g. Spain).
Income smoothing through loan loss provisions is also strictly related to capital adequacy issues. Annual loan loss provisions diminish bottom line profits and thus affect annual retained earnings, feeding into capital. On the other hand, the stock of loan loss reserves is aimed to cover expected losses in credit portfolios, when these occur. Capital is earmarked as a buffer for the unexpected part of a bank's loss distribution (Kim and Santomero 1993, Laeven and Majnoni 2003) . However, during economic downturns, banks usually face severe problems with asset quality and when loan loss reserves are not sufficient, they have to use capital to cover credit losses. In such moments, capital requirements increase in line with lower asset quality, but additional capital is pricy or unavailable for weaker banks 2 In this paper, loan loss provisions (LLP) is the annual net result of changes in the stock of (specific) loan loss reserves (LLR). LLP are a flow variable from the profit and loss statement, while LLR are the stock variable diminishing the value of gross loans on the balance sheet. Specific loan loss reserves (LLR) are different from general loan loss reserves, which are included in capital and created from net profit after taxation. LLP usually constitute a cost item and reduce the tax base. In the literature LLP are also sometimes related to as charge-offs, write-offs or annual reserves. We apply the above LLP and LLR definitions throughout the paper, for consistency. (Bikker and Metzemakers 2005) . This implies restricting further credit activities, if banks want to remain within regulatory capital adequacy limits. Such a credit crunch negatively impacts the whole economy, restricting financing to the real sector and delaying the potential economic upheaval (e.g. through investments). Within this rationale, many authors indicate that adequate levels of loan loss reserves, created during better times, allow to reduce the procyclicality of minimum capital requirements and avoid a credit crunch (Laeven and Majnoni 2003) .
On the other hand, similarly as in companies, more stable income levels affect multiple outcomes in banks, apart from credit risk and capital considerations. Fluctuations of bottom line profits are used on capital markets as an element of risk indicators, based on the Z-score methodology (see e.g. Levine 2009, or Lepetit et al. 2008) . Smooth income streams result in lower perceived riskiness, directly impacting rating levels, funding costs and share price as such (e.g. Greenawalt and Sinkey 1988) . As a result, managementand shareholder related outcomes are strongly affected, as managerial compensation schemes, managerial reputation or even job stability, as well as shareholder returns, significantly depend on restricted fluctuations of net profits. In this context, income smoothing is a desired practice by both shareholders and managers and maximises their utility (Lambert 1984) . Due to higher valuations of income-smoothing firms, investors expect these practices and the lack thereof provides a negative signal for the capital market (Goel and Thakor 2003) .
The above context becomes especially important when paired with the role of managerial discretion in loan loss reserve decisions. It is assumed that despite existing (and sometimes detailed) regulations on reserve levels, bank managers possess some level of discretion over annual loan loss provisions (e.g. Bikker and Metzemakers 2005) . Annual provisions are the sum of a non-discretionary part, stemming from the default assessment of the loan portfolio, and the discretionary part, relating to managerial judgment (see e.g. Beatty et al. 1995 , Ahmed et al. 1999 . In consequence, the negative aspect of the income smoothing process relates to the discretionary part of the loan loss reserve decision, which bank managers exploit in order to maximise their private benefits, rather than improve bank value.
Such a non-prudential motivation of income smoothing is regarded negatively and assumed to diminish the benefits of income smoothing stemming from forward-looking provisioning only.
Empirical results on earnings management differ. Early studies of income smoothing base on the US based bank results from previous economic cycles and are not uniform in conclusions. Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) confirm income smoothing for US bank data between 1976-1984, so before the introduction of the Basel I regulations. Collins et al. (1995) find support for income smoothing, on a US bank sample between 1971-1991. In opposition to this, Beatty et al. (1995) find no evidence for earnings management through LLPs, using a sample of 148 US banks between 1985 and 1989. 3 In a similar vein, Ahmed et al. (1999) disconfirms the earnings management hypothesis on a 1986-1995 US sample.
More recent studies basing on later business cycle and bank results, with more international samples, provide vast empirical evidence for the existence of income smoothing.
G10 banks are demonstrated to be more engaged in income smoothing and act more anitcyclically than banks in developing non-G10 countries (Cavallo and Majnoni 2002 (Laeven and Majnoni 2003) .
Methodology and bank data
Empirically, income smoothing in financial institutions is analysed according to two main methodologies. The first one relies on studying income distributions of banks across time and around specific benchmarks, such as zero profitability or zero changes in profitability. Probability of certain events, such as e.g. generating small losses and small gains, is assumed to be equal, but this is not mirrored in bank results (Shen and Chih 2005) . In consequence, irregularities around benchmark values are viewed as earnings management and may materialise for example in higher frequency of small gains than of small losses, with subsequent accumulation of losses, or benchmark beating behaviour (see e.g. Beatty et al. 2002) .
The second, more frequently used method of studying income smoothing in financial institutions is the analysis of loan loss provisions cyclicality. This framework is used in our paper. In such a setting, income smoothing is usually understood as a positive relation between loan loss provisions and earnings. An early version of the subsequently amended model was introduced by Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) , where the functional version is The standard dependent variable is unchanged, as the level of loan loss provisions in current year (LLP). The main explanatory variable is pre-provisioning operating income (Income), accounting for the main income smoothing effect. In dynamic setups, the equation is extended by lagged LLP levels of up to two periods. Additional aspects of cyclicality of loan loss provisions are analysed through adding loan growth (NLoans), where a positive relation with LLP implies that banks are forward-looking in their reserve making policies in that they increase reserves when loan portfolios are boosted (Laeven and Majnoni 2003) .
Loan loss reserves (LLR) control for existing levels or credit risk or earlier provisioning policy, sometimes substituted by non-performing loan ratios (NPL). Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) presume in fact that NPL reflect underlying credit risk more accurately, but refrain from using them due to scarce data availability. The underlying credit or default risk is a proxy for the non-discretionary part of the loan loss provision, with the deviations from this representing the managerial, discretionary part. Liu and Ryan (2006) exclude LLR and use a change in the level of non-performing loans as an equivalent of the non-discretionary part of LLP, reflecting the changing degree of loan defaults and prevailing credit risk level.
Bank capital levels (Capital) control for potential capital management through LLP, although Perez et al. (2008) The second aspect of LLP cyclicality, apart from their relation to internal bank variables, bases on the link with macroeconomic cycles. As a result, macroeconomic variables (GDP growth or GDP growth per capita, inflation and unemployment) not only control for external environments and exogenous risk factors influencing reserve levels, but the relation between LLP and GDP as such provides information on income smoothing. A negative link to GDP indicates that banks smooth income only in relation to their internal condition and not in the broader economic context. In such a case, economic downturns result in a necessity of creating additional provisions, despite some income smoothing versus bank income. On the other hand, periods of high economic growth are not used to create sufficient buffers "for a rainy day", indicating that income smoothing may in fact be driven also by non-prudential motivations, such as managerial private benefits.
Basing on static versions of Laeven and Majnoni (2003) , Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) , Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) and Perez et al. (2008), we use the following model to study income smoothing in our paper:
Equation (3.3) includes all standard variables described above. In addition, are individual bank fixed effects, stable through time and are random errors. In the estimation, (3.3) is sequentially amended to account for potential additional control variables, including bank internal variables, year dummies, crisis-period dummies, recession dummies and country interaction terms. Three additional robustness checks are presented at the end. All estimations have been performed as fixed effects models for panel data, although the robustness in the random effects specification has also been verified (not shown).
The bank sample originally consisted of 245 banks from twelve Central European countries ("Raw sample", Table 3 .1). 4 However, this sample has been restricted, due to data availability, particularly relating to non-performing loans, as well 1% and 99% centile exclusions. The raw sample is used for some calculations, such as some means, value of banking sector assets etc. and this is shown. The sample after exclusions ("Final sample") is an unbalanced panel of 198 banks, with varying data availability for different years (see Table   5 , Annex). All bank financial data stems from the Bankscope database, while macroeconomic data is from the IMF. Countries in the sample are not homogenous as to their banking or accounting regulations, supervisory systems and banking system specifications. Below, we shortly summarise some differences between particular systems, especially with regards to size, structure of the balance sheet, credit risk ratios and main income trends. The sample was constructed by choosing available commercial banks from twelve countries, including only living banks and banks that have accessible financial reports from at least end-2008.
Although the number of countries in our sample is not excessively large, important discrepancies between countries have to be considered, both in the macroeconomic 5 Bank assets are the sum of total assets of banks included in the raw sample, specified above, and not the total banking system size. European banks had to make additional provisions (Graph 3.6.). Again, the three largest banking sectors were least hit by additional reserves, while their smaller counterparts had to face substantial additional reserves. The worsening quality of the loan portfolio and additional provisions required to cover it severely undermined profits of some banks, leading to lower profitability in the post-2007 era (Graph 3.7.). The visible burden of additional loan loss reserves in the post-2008 period significantly affected bottomline profitability of Central European banks. Losses of the smaller banking sectors were coupled with their exploding reserve levels, while more modest reserve making in other countries allowed to maintain high profitability. Thus, an argument for income smoothing potentially emerges here, as banks with smaller reserve needs are able to withstand crisis times with healthier -although still depressed -net results. Year-end losses for many banks directly translate into decreased levels of capital, through retained earnings. As a result, the financial crisis in Central European banks has meant a shift into higher credit risk (NPL) and lower coverage of further unexpected loan defaults (capital), which is visible in Graph 3.8.. 6 The capital level in our paper is measured by the -imperfect -equity to assets ratio. This is caused by limited data availability on Tier 1 or total capital adeqauacy in Bankscope, both of which would provide much better capital level information. The above brief descriptive statistics reveals that the relatively short time span of 2004-2010 included both eonomic prosperity times and a recession in most Central European banking sectors. As a result, banks during that period had a chance to exploit both healthy earnings and GDP levels, and use them in recession times to soften the blow on their bottomline results. On the other hand, strong diversity in bank results and crisis impact reveals that bank reactions to high profitability may also diverge and depend on national trends. The next Section demonstrates results of the empirical estimation of the main income smoothing model, and some additional specifications.
Empirical results
The empirical model (3.3.) was estimated using the final sample, defined in Section 3.
The main variables are shortly presented in Table 4 .1. The estimation results of Equation (3.3.) are presented in Table 4 indicates that Central European banks increase provisions when income is rising, at a given level of non-performing loans. The captured income smoothing effect possibly relates to the discretionary elements of reserve making, as the default probability within the loan portfolio is controlled for, through irregular loan levels (NPL) and additionally by the share of assets in total loans. ^Pre-provisions Income in year t, total assets in year t-1; ^^Total Assets are scaled downwards by 1mln, to achieve coherent coefficient sizes, so the final input is Total Assets/1.000.000; ^^^all macroeconomic indicators are IMF data; *, ** and *** note significance levels of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%.
This potentially anticyclical policy of Central European banks is however countered by a strong procyclical relation between provisions and GDP growth. A robust, negative link between GDP and provisioning levels indicates that although some discretionary income Table 4 .3. ^Pre-provisions Income in year t, total assets in year t-1; ^^Total Assets are scaled downwards by 1mln, to achieve coherent coefficient sizes, so the final input is Total Assets/1.000.000; ^^^all macroeconomic indicators are IMF data; *, ** and *** note significance levels of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%.
Income smoothing has remained relatively unchanged throughout the studied period and during the financial crisis. The addition of either year effects or consolidated crisis-year effects has not affected loan loss provisioning levels. A weak positive link between the levles of provisions and the financial crisis time dummy is found in Specification 3, however it is not very stable. The addition of year dummies in Specification 4 proves that none of the studied years emerges as significant, possibly also due to including macroeconomic variables such as GDP and inflation, which partly control for time effects.
On the other hand, time or year dummies may not be sufficient to control for the crisis effects, especially that difficult macroeconomic conditions have occured in some Central European countries outside the 2008-2010 period (Graph 3.2.), while in others the financial crisis time span has not materialised in the form of extremely low GDP growth (Graph 3.2.).
In addition, the procyclicality of provisions towards the macroeconomic cycle is one of the crucial findings in our results and we investigate this further by adding dummy variables for recessions in the form of low GDP levels, in line with Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) . This constitutes an additional anticyclicality test of provisions versus macroeconomic conditions, regardless of the financial crisis time span. The modified Equation 3.5. is presented below. (3.5.) In 3.5., variable Recession is a dummy variable defined in two possible ways. The first relates to a below average GDP growth (GDP below average), which has been calculated across years and countries for the whole sample period and amounts to a relatively high level of 3.3%. The second relates to very low GDP levels and has been set at maximum 2% (GDP below 2%) 7 , showing thus countries in sever threat or at borderline of recession, considering developping country standards. Results of estimating Equation 3.5. are presented in Table 4 .4.
Adding controls for low and extremely low GDP levels provides evidence for recessions being special cases in income smoothing. Although introducing an interaction term of Low GDP*Income does not yield a significant relation with LLP (not shown), low GDP growth rates are important for the volume of current LLP. Upon reaching low GDP levels, loan loss provisions decrease, possibly in order to soften the blow of the recession on the already depressed level of bank earnings. This effect is marginally significant for below average GDP, but increases both in strength and significance once GDP growth falls below 2%. The relatively short time span and high diversity of our sample do not allow to draw 7 Bikker and Metzemakers assume a level of 3% overly far-reaching conclusions on this result, but it proves that recessions should be treated as a special case and controlled for in further studies with longer data streams. ^Pre-provisions Income in year t, total assets in year t-1; ^^Total Assets are scaled downwards by 1mln, to achieve coherent coefficient sizes, so the final input is Total Assets/1.000.000; ^^^all macroeconomic indicators are IMF data; *, ** and *** note significance levels of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%. 3.6.) In Equation 3.6., the additional variable Country smoothing is an interaction term, constructed from the country dummy variable and pre-provisioning income (scaled by lagged assets). Results of estimating this equation on the whole sample are shown in Table 4 .5. ^Pre-provisions Income in year t, total assets in year t-1; ^^Total Assets are scaled downwards by 1mln, to achieve coherent coefficient sizes, so the final input is Total Assets/1.000.000; ^^^all macroeconomic indicators are IMF data; *, ** and *** note significance levels of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%.
Our main income smoothing and procyclicality results remain unchanged after adding country controls. The income smoothing process in the three chosen countries does not prove significant, which indicates that it is possibly a bank-determined phenomenon rather than a country-specific event. On the other hand, the country samples are relatively small so these results should be treated as an indication of a trend rather than ultimate proof for lack of national specific approaches. ^Pre-provisions Income in year t, total assets in year t-1; ^^Total Assets are scaled downwards by 1mln, to achieve coherent coefficient sizes, so the final input is Total Assets/1.000.000; ^^^all macroeconomic indicators are IMF data; *, ** and *** note significance levels of respectively 10%, 5% and 1%.
Robustness tests
The third robustness test stems from a rationale put forward by Perez et al. (2008) .
They stipulate that income smoothing in banks may be different for periods of higher and lower profitability, relative to a long-term benchmark (defined here as the mean profit before provisions for the available years). They use the absolute value of a deviation from the longterm benchmark as a control variable, which emerges positive but significant only at 14% level. In consequence, they stipulate that a possible trend of increasing income smoothing in times of expansion could exist, even though the use of the absolute value indicates that in fact all positive and negative deviations from the mean profit enhance income smoothing. We base on this rationale in our ROE variable.
Our variable is constructed as a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the value of previous year's ROE deviates from average ROE for banks in the same country by more than 5 percentage points (in plus or in minus). The reasoning behind this is that banks, their shareholders and capital market investors use ROE as the main benchmark of profitability assessment. If a particular bank lands far below or far above average profitability in the sector, it may be more tempted to engage in income smoothing the following year, either to create reserves for future times (high earners) or exploit existing reserves to boost current profits (low earners).
Results in Specification 3 provide evidence that a link between past profits and current income smoothing did not exist in Central European banks in the 2005-2010 period. This may be caused by a few factors, apart from the real lack of the above reasoning in LLP creation.
First, ROE is an imperfect profitability indicator, as it is frequently corrected by risk weighted capital. In addition, ROE includes a tax element, which could distort the picture. Last but certainly not least, banks most probably compare themselves not to a national average, but to a chosen peer group, so a deviation from a national average (based on data only from banks in the sample) could not be adequate. We strongly believe that further research should be conducted in this area, as income smoothing in particular banks is most definitely affected by policies of peer institutions.
Conclusions
We have examined whether Central European banks used loan loss provisions to smooth their income in the period 2005-2010 and whether these provisions were procyclical towards bank internal and credit cycles and macroeconomic cycles. Our empirical findings provide evidence that Central European banks behave in line with their developed country counterparts. They display stable income smoothing trends, using periods of high profitability to build loan loss reserves, which are consumed in periods when earnings slump. On the other hand, no income smoothing nor procyclicality towards the credit expansion cycle is detected, unlike in some cases of developed banks, which are shown to decrease provisioning in credit boost times. Income smoothing may relate to the discretionary behaviour of bank managers, as it emerges after the default risk in the credit portfolio is controlled for.
On the other hand, Central European banks have been demonstrated to create provisions procyclically towards the macroeconomic cycle, not using expansion phases to create sound reserve buffers for future recessions. In consequence, during lower growth phases banks in Central Europe may be forced to use their capital to cover loan losses, which increases the procyclicality effects of existing capital regulations. This may contribute to a credit crunch and a longer time necessary to reach an economic rebound. LITHUANIA  3  5  6  8  8  7  8  POLAND  1  11  14  13  17  20  16  ROMANIA  1  1  7  13  15  17  15  SLOVAKIA  7  6  6  10  11  10  9  SLOVENIA  4  8  10  10  14  14  14  TURKEY  9  12  14  19  22  25  24  SUM  55  81  99  131  163  174  155 
